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RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 1226
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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: UN AND NGO COMMUNITY ON INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR
EASTERN CHAD: NO INTERNAL INTERFERENCE

11. (SBU) SUMMARY. In two separate meetings on November 21, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Chad made clear that any eventual international force on the eastern border with Sudan should focus on protection of humanitarian corridors and not involve itself in Chadian internal political-military affairs. The UN Technical Assessment Team (TAM), currently in the Central African Republic, will return to N'Djamena on November 27 when it will brief the diplomatic community before traveling to the east from November 28-30. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi will meet up with the TAM in Chad on November 30 and will brief the Ambassador on the TAM's conclusions on December 2. END SUMMARY.

WHAT A FORCE WILL DO

14. (SBU) UNDP Chief Kingsley Amaning was explicit that the force should serve as a clearly visible deterrent against humanitarian displacements and cross-border attacks, in particular the Janjaweed. He also said that the force should act as a barrier against rebel infiltration into the refugee camps. Amaning also looked to the force to report on human

rights violations occurring in eastern Chad as a means of highlighting for the international community the magnitude of the "atrocities."

WHAT A FORCE WILL NOT DO

15. (SBU) At both meetings the UN and NGO communities made clear their belief that the eventual force should not get involved in Chadian political-military internal affairs. Specifically, UNDP warned against the force's being seen as supporting the Government of Chad's (GOC) political-military aspirations or as intervening against the powerful anti-Deby rebellion. UNHCR later pointed out that avoiding such pitfalls would be easier in theory than in practice. UNDP also cautioned against the force assuming entirely what should be the GOC's responsibility to protect the humanitarian community operating in the east. The issue of whether the force would have the authority to chase perpetrators across the border was debated but not resolved.

TO ARM OR NOT TO ARM

16. (SBU) No consensus could be reached among the UN and humanitarian representatives over whether an international presence in eastern Chad should be armed and as such be allowed to make armed interventions. UNDP insists that President Deby's precondition for accepting such a force in Chad, which, in UNDP's view would be unarmed police forces, made the issue a moot point, but NGOs in particular questioned the efficacy of a unarmed team of monitors in the face of an armed, aggressive enemy.

17. (SBU) The CARE Country Director argued that by way of precedent, the only factor that brought peace and ultimately established order in Sierra Leone was the arrival of armed British forces. A UNHCR representative countered that the unarmed UN Protection Force in Bosnia was an example of a

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successful unarmed monitoring mission. Representatives of the diplomatic community were equally skeptical of how a force that lacked the mandate to "shoot back" could be effective in eastern Chad.

THE BIGGER THE FORCE, THE BETTER

18. (SBU) There was general agreement among the humanitarian and UN agencies that a force size of several hundred civilian forces would be insufficient to ensure security in eastern Chad, given the number of troops amassing on both sides of the border and given the deterioration of the situation as a result of inter-ethnic conflict, such as in Goz Beida. UNDP argued that the bigger the force size, the stronger the message sent as a deterrent.

19. (SBU) UNDP raised the point that force size may be determined by whether or not "hybrid" forces are ultimately deployed in Darfur. If troop levels on that side of the border are sufficiently high to secure the situation, Aمانing asserted that a similarly large presence might not be necessary in eastern Chad. He also noted President Deby's concerns that a large UN force on the border might give Sudanese President Bashir a pretext to further destabilize Chad.

THE SOONER, THE BETTER

110. (SBU) UNDP Chief told the diplomatic corps that he did not expect any force to arrive in Chad before the end of January 2007, something the NGO community grudgingly acknowledged, although they continued to hope to have the force installed as soon as possible. UNDP pledged to raise issues of timing and force size with DPKO A/SYG Hedi Annabi when he met up with the TAM November 30. Annabi is scheduled to de-brief the Ambassador on December 2 after his meeting with President Deby earlier in the day. As a sidenote, UNDP

Chief informed that French PM de Villepin would visit N'Djamena for four hours beginning at 0930 local time on November 30 as one leg of a trip that also includes Johannesburg and Brazzaville.

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